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Construction, Solipsism and Intuitionistic 
Mathematics 
Kevin Blum 
 
The classical view of logic dominated the 
Second International Congress of Philosophy in 1904.  
Classical logicians, such as Couturat, believed 
mathematics exist independent of the human mind.1  
For these philosophers, mathematics was an eternal 
truth awaiting discovery by human reason.  Other 
logicians fiercely opposed this view.  At the same 
Congress, Boutroux contended that philosophers should 
investigate the human preference for particular forms of 
mathematics within the “infinity of alternative, equally 
possible [forms].”2   Boutroux made this contention 
because he believed that mathematics lacks another 
kind of existence besides that conferred on them by 
humans.  Poincaré furthered this objection to classical 
logic, evidencing the “inescapably ‘intuitive’ character 
of logical reasoning.” 3  Both argued for a philosophical 
investigation into the conventions underlying the 
existent mathematical systems.  Thus began the field of 
intuitionistic mathematics; a philosophy based upon the 
innately human, intuitive origins of mathematics.  
Intuitionistic mathematics provides an informative 
challenge to classical logic, specifically through 
establishing mathematics as a human construction.  
Furthermore, Intuitionistic mathematics is able to 
overcome the consequence of the aforementioned 
assertion and one of its principle objections; the charge 
that Intuitionism leads to solipsism. 
                                                
1 G. D.  Bowne, The Philosophy of Logic 1880-1908 (Netherlands: 
Mouton and Company, 1966) p. 127. 
2 Bowne 109. 
3 Bowne 127. 
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Until 1907 this brief foray exploring the role of 
intuition in mathematics and logic seemed forgotten.  In 
that year L. E. J. Brouwer published his sometimes 
poetic and often obscure work, On the Foundations of 
Mathematics.4  Alongside his precursors Boutroux and 
Poincaré, Brouwer objected to the system of classical 
logic.  More importantly, he disagreed with their 
position as well.  He argued that the classical and early 
intuitionistic logicians mistakenly supplanted the 
intuition of mathematics with the language of 
mathematics.5  For Brouwer, mathematics arises out of 
intuition. In support of his view, Brouwer drew from 
Kant’s philosophy of a priori synthetic knowledge.  
According to both philosophers, time is a necessary 
component of experience.6  Brouwer further argued that 
there exists a close connection between time, the Self, 
and the idea of mathematics.  Specifically, the mind 
experiences a singular moment that gives rise to 
another, all the while preserving a memory of the first 
moment.  The experience is caused by an awareness of 
the Self’s continuity over time.7  In Brouwer’s terms 
this simultaneous experience is the perception of a 
“twoity.”  Recollecting the twoity at later moments 
gives humans the notion of unity among twoities.  The 
mind extends these synthetic experiences over again to 
form the typical conceptions of mathematics, such as 
infinity and arithmetic.  Thus, for Brouwer, the intuitive 
                                                
4 S. C. Kleene and R. E. Vesley,  The Foundations of Intuitionistic 
Mathematics, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of 
Mathematics Series (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1965) 1. 
5 Bowne 142. 
6 Michael Detlefsen, “Constructive Existence Claims,” The 
Philosophy of Mathematics Today, ed. Matthias Schirn (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998) 316. 
7 Detlefsen 318. 
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simultaneous experience of moments arising out of 
each-other is the basis of all mathematics.8   
Brouwer’s claim that mathematics begins in 
intuition has significant epistemic consequences.  First, 
the assertion privileges the epistemic value of 
intuitions. 9   This is clear after acknowledging 
Brouwer’s use of yet another preceding philosopher; 
namely, Descartes.  Brouwer adopted the epistemic 
method of Descartes’ Meditations, developing his 
knowledge of mathematics from the point of intuition.  
Such a method was required since, for Brouwer, 
mathematics originates in intuition, just as certain 
knowledge originates in the intuitive experience of the 
thinking Self for Descartes.  Thus, for both 
philosophers, certainty is derived from a claim’s 
proximity to intuitions of the Self.10  Consequently, any 
mathematical claim distanced from the Self introduces 
the possibility of error.  Such “distance” is created 
through symbolizing or otherwise representing 
intuitions; distinctly non-intuitive activities.  Any 
formalization of intuition constitutes “an incomplete 
communication of information.”11  Intuitions by their 
nature are language-less experiences so any 
representation of them in language admits error.   
Furthermore, according to Brouwer, “intuition 
proceeds independently of… ...formalization”12  such 
that “a mathematical entity is not necessarily 
predeterminate, and may, in its state of free growth, at 
some time acquire a property which it did not posses 
                                                
8 D. van Dalen, ed.,  Brouwer’s Cambridge Lectures on 
Intuitionism (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981) 4. 
9 Detlefsen 319. 
10 Detlefsen 316. 
11 Kleene and Vesley 93. 
12 A. Heyting, Intuitionism an Introduction, Studies in Logic and 
the Foundations of Mathematics Series (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1966) 5. 
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before.”13  This curious phenomenon occurs because 
Intuitionists redefine the meaning of mathematical 
assertions, in opposition to the meaning described by 
classical logicians.  Classical logicians believe that a 
statement is either true or false.  Brouwer countered this 
by claiming that (i) the assertion of a mathematical 
statement is that it is provable, (ii) the assertion of the 
negation of a mathematical statement is that the 
assumption of the statement in a proof leads to an 
absurdity and (iii) some particular assertions may be 
neither proven true nor absurd. 14    Brouwer’s 
demonstration of the necessity for this redefinition is 
illustrated below in his argument against the Law of the 
Excluded Middle.  Formalizations are both distanced 
from intuition and have meanings that are subject to 
change.  This gives intuitions an epistemic privilege 
above non-intuitive mathematical claims. 
Such privilege becomes significant in relation to 
the second epistemic consequence of Brouwer’s claim 
that mathematics originates intuitively; that is, formal 
mathematics becomes a human construction.  If 
intuition is the only ground for certain knowledge in 
mathematics, any non-intuitive claim is chosen by the 
mathematician.  Such choice over non-intuitive 
mathematical claims entails that truths are created, 
rather than discovered.15  Thus, formal mathematical 
claims are constructions because they are non-intuitive.  
Moreover, since the Self is the source of knowledge, 
anything epistemic assertion that exists must exist 
through the Self. 16   This entails that mathematical 
systems are merely constructions of the 
mathematician’s mind since epistemic entities only 
obtain existence through intuitions of the Self.  Because 
                                                
13 van Dalen 92. 
14  van Dalen 92. 
15 Detlefsen 320. 
16 Detlefsen 321. 
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mathematical formalizations are chosen and do not 
obtain epistemic existence through human minds they 
are necessarily constructed.  
The assertion that mathematical systems are 
constructions may at first appear to be insignificant.  
However, it results in important consequences for 
formal mathematical systems such as classical logic.  In 
such systems there is a “distinctness of mathematics 
from the language in which mathematics is 
expressed.”17  The “distinctness” comes to pass because 
mathematics is an intuition whereas the language of 
mathematics is a human construction.18  According to 
Brouwer, formal mathematics developed from 
mathematicians’ construction of symbolic parallels to 
their intuitive experience.  Thus, classical logicians 
create the formalizations that Brouwer cautions as 
fallible.  The problem is that classical logicians believe 
in the “existence of immutable properties of time and 
space, properties independent of experience and of 
language.” 19   This belief leads them to ignore the 
Intuitionist’s warning that formalizations are fallible 
“[T]he classical mathematician thinks of himself as 
reasoning about an objective, external domain of 
entities”, whereas the Intuitionist recognizes the 
constructed nature of mathematical entities. 20   The 
incautious reasoning of the classical logicians leads to 
demonstrably meaningless claims.  Brouwer’s proof 
against Law of the Excluded Middle demonstrates both 
                                                
17 Kleene and Vesley 1. 
18 S. Shapiro, ed.,  Intensional Mathematics, Studies in Logic and 
the Foundations of Mathematics Series (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1985) 23. 
19 van Dalen 1. 
20 A. Kino, J. Myhill and R. E. Vesley, eds.,  Intuitionism and 
Proof Theory,  Studies in Logic and the Foundations of 
Mathematics Series (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1970) 101. 
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his meaning of “meaningless” and the significant 
consequence of formalizing mathematics. 
For Brouwer, the LEM is a formal assertion 
devoid of mathematical meaning.  Such meaningless 
claims have the same epistemic value as those pointed 
out in the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
Logico Philosophicus.  The claims made by classical 
logicians are not so much wrong as they are 
nonsensical.   This is because, by necessity, such claims 
do not describe things in the world, since the only real 
mathematical entities are human intuitions.  The LEM 
is particularly susceptible to Intuitionist critique since it 
necessitates the existence of entities that are yet to be 
constructed.  For intuitionists, sensibility is faithfulness 
to the intuitive origins of mathematics.  Non-
performable and therefore nonsensical constructions are 
too far removed from intuition.  Since formal 
mathematics is a human construction prone to error, it 
is patently erroneous to formalize over non-constructed, 
non-intuited entities.  The constructions of classical 
logicians such as the LEM commit such error. 
Brouwer used the following argument to 
demonstrate the fallibility of this Law and the fallibility 
of constructing mathematical formalizations in 
general.21  Write down the expansion of π with the 
expansion of .333333… below it.  Call the lower 
expansion (that of .333333...) R.  When, and if, the 
expansion of π creates a sequence …0123456789… halt 
the expansion of R.  Call the digit where the 9 in the π 
sequence of ...0123456789... occurs µ.  This digit also 
marks when the R expansion halts.  Now, suppose R 
cannot be a rational number.  This means the digit µ 
cannot occur.  Therefore, no sequence of 
…0123456789… occurs in π.  But if no such sequence 
occurs in π the expansion of R continues forever.  
                                                
21 van Dalen 6. 
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However, this would make R a rational number because 
it is equal to one-third.  Thus, a contradiction results 
from the supposition that R is a rational number.  At 
this point classical logicians would assert that R must 
be a rational number.  Intuitionists such as Brouwer 
deny this.  If R is a rational number there must be two 
known integers, call them p and q, such that p divided 
by q is equal to R.  However, this requires either 
knowledge of the sequence …0123456789… in π, or 
the ability to show that the sequence never occurs.  
Since the sequence is not yet known to occur in the 
construction of π it is impossible to assert the number 
that is R. 
This argument is more accessible in symbolic 
terms.  First, make the supposition that R is not rational.  
Symbolize this as “¬p”.  This resulted in a contradiction 
that is then inferred to result in ¬¬p.  From this 
negation of a falsity, classical logicians assert a positive 
truth, symbolized as “p”.  Intuitionists deny this 
assertion because it is based on the LEM.  This law 
asserts that all statements, including mathematical ones, 
are either true or false (symbolized as pv¬p).  This is 
fine for a classical logician because they believe in the 
objective mathematical truth or falsity of p.  
Intuitionists, however, point out that the value of the R 
expansion is as yet unknown, and therefore no assertion 
can be made regarding it.  Roughly, this argument 
shows that for intuitionists, ¬¬p does not imply p.22  
For intuitionists to accept the LEM some method must 
exist to determine which of p or ¬p is true for any 
proposition p.  Unfortunately, no such method exists. 
Such a formal presentation of intuitionistic logic 
seems to contradict one of Brouwer’s main beliefs.  He 
argued that any attempt to bring mathematics outside 
the internal intuitive experience results in fallibility and 
                                                
22 Heyting 100. 
 95 
loss of meaning.  He also criticized others for 
developing formal mathematical systems.  This seems 
hypocritical, given that Brouwer expressed 
mathematical arguments for intuitionism in both writing 
and speech, such as his proof against the LEM.  Though 
he rejected a formal construction of mathematics, 
Brouwer did admit to the usefulness of formalizing 
intuitively correct constructions.23  Heyting, a student 
of Brouwer, later claimed that Brouwer’s objection to 
formalization only applied to formalization without 
consideration for the meaning of what is formalized.24  
Brouwer’s own words provide evidence for Heyting’s 
claim.  According to Brouwer, classical logic studies 
the constructions of mathematicians, rather than the 
intuitions that give rise to mathematics.25  Essentially, 
classical logic formalizes mathematical constructions, 
whereas Intuitionists formalize intuitions only.  
Classical logic is problematic because their 
formalizations are in ignorance of the source of 
mathematical meaning, specifically intuitions.   
Nevertheless, the critique of hypocrisy is minor 
compared to the problem that rests in the roots of 
intuitionism itself.  This problem is a logical 
consequence of the Intuitionist’s claim that 
mathematics is a human construction.  Explicitly, how 
is any communication of mathematics a sensible and 
worthwhile activity?  What allows Brouwer and the 
Intuitionists to decide and formalize their so-called 
“intuitively correct constructions”?  Mathematics arises 
out of an intuitive experience and thereafter is subject 
to fallibility and loss of meaning due to the limitations 
                                                
23 Joan Moschovakis, “Intuitionistic Logic,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2002 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/logic-
intuitionistic/>. 
24 Kleene and Vesley 3. 
25 Bowne 143. 
 96 
of language. 26   Such problems arise since formal 
systems are never adequate as they are linguistically 
removed from mathematical intuition.27  It seems that 
intuitionism is caught in the trap of solipsism.  
Furthermore, an intuitionist cannot rely on past 
mathematical constructions.  Unless such constructions 
are remembered they must be recorded in some manner, 
thereby removing them from the certainty of intuition.  
It appears that Intuitionistic mathematicians must admit 
to an extreme form of solipsism; a lack of certainty in 
the knowledge of one’s very Self over time. 
This is a serious charge against Intuitionism.  
Mathematics is a valuable method and a science that 
most would wish to retain.  The proliferation and 
development of mathematics itself are evidence 
enough.  Even Brouwer himself stands in agreement.  
He felt mathematics was central to human experience, 
finding its source in the intuitions of the Self. 28  
Brouwer also believed mathematics is central to 
“human epistemic life” since the synthetic experience is 
applied to human experience in the world, per Kant.29  
If mathematics is so vital to both empirical 
investigation and human experience, why does Brouwer 
make its communicability, when not meaningless, at the 
very least prone to error? 
Intuitionist Mathematicians can make at least 
three responses to the charge of solipsism.  First, since 
mathematical systems are the product of human 
construction mathematicians must change their 
objectives.  The underlying accusation in the indictment 
of solipsism is that it limits the certainty of 
mathematical investigation; an admittedly valuable 
activity.  Intuitionists respond by reframing 
                                                
26 Kleene and Vesley 93. 
27 Heyting 5. 
28 Detlefsen 331. 
29 Detlefsen 331. 
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mathematics into an enterprise more cautious than that 
of the classical logicians.  The purpose of classical logic 
is an attempt to penetrate the “objective, external 
domain of [mathematical] entities.”30   By sweeping 
aside this platonistic account and establishing 
mathematics as a human construction, the intention of 
mathematics must be directed by the exclusion of 
error. 31   This is because there are no formal 
mathematical truths to discover.  The accusation of 
solipsism loses its teeth since mathematicians must 
abandon their hope for non-intuitive certainty.  This 
response assuages the concern that Intuitionistic 
mathematical beliefs are too limited by giving 
mathematics a new purpose.  Accordingly, the charge 
of solipsism loses some of its persuasiveness. 
Nevertheless, merely redefining mathematics 
seems somewhat dissatisfactory as a response to the 
accusation that Intuitionistic Mathematics leads to 
solipsism.  A second response attempts to justify 
Intuitionistic formalizations.  According to Brouwer, 
“inner experience reveals how, by unlimited unfolding 
of the basic intuition [of the Self over time], much of 
‘separable’ mathematics can be rebuilt in a suitably 
modified form.”32  For Brouwer, some mathematical 
constructions achieve a transmission of truth from the 
certainty of intuition.  However, these particular 
constructions must be constructed according to a 
general form.  Brouwer called this form of construction 
a “law-like choice sequence.” 33   That is, Brouwer 
allows formal construction so long as mathematicians 
utilize some constant method of determining the 
epistemic value of constructions.  This method enforces 
                                                
30 Kino, Myhill and Vesley 101. 
31 Detlefsen 320. 
32 van Dalen 5. 
33 Richard Tieszen, “Intuitionism, Meaning Theory and 
Cognition,” History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (2000): 179-194. 
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the equal epistemic value of the constructions; the 
constructions would be true relative to each other, if not 
objectively true.  The constant method is the form of 
construction that matches human intuition.  Humans 
experience a constancy of form in their intuition of the 
“unfolding” Self over time.  Moreover, though always 
the same, intuitions are constantly recreated, and can be 
separated into distinct experiences.  This allows 
mathematicians to use constructions over time since 
they share the form of constant, yet endlessly repeated 
intuitions.34  The constancy and repetition of intuition 
give mathematicians the general form to follow when 
constructing mathematics.  So long as constructions 
share the form of intuitions, Intuitionists can accept 
formalization.   
Brouwer’s principle objection to classical logic, 
and formalized mathematics in general, is that they 
utilize unproven constructions. 35   The Law of the 
Excluded Middle is an example of such use.  Because 
the formalizations used in the LEM are as yet not 
constructed, such formalizations are completely 
removed from intuition.  This entails that they fail to 
meet Brouwer’s requirement that constructions follow 
the general form of intuitions.  Moreover, such 
mathematical formalizations lack existence because 
they do not begin from intuitions of the Self.  Again, 
this is because the Self is the measure of existence.36  
Lacking a method to construct such formalizations, 
mathematicians must exclude their use.  However, since 
other constructions proceed from intuition, Brouwer 
allows their use.  This both relieves Intuitionists from 
the requirement of constructing mathematical 
                                                
34 Tieszen 180. 
35 van Dalen 5. 
36 Detlefsen 321. 
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formalizations each time they are used and undermines 
the accusation that Intuitionism leads to solipsism. 
 The third response to the allegation that 
Intuitionistic mathematics results in solipsism utilizes 
the shared nature of mathematical intuitions.  Brouwer 
certainly believed that mathematical formalizations 
were chosen; such was the source of his assertion that 
mathematical systems are constructs.  Nevertheless, in 
drawing from the philosophy of Kant, Brouwer made 
very similar claims to Kant’s argument that humans use 
an a priori category of time for organizing experience.  
According to Brouwer, humans use the intuition of 
mathematics in their perception of existence.  Unlike 
Kant, Brouwer believed that the utilization of 
mathematics is freely chosen by humans.  The twoity 
that develops out of a perception of the Self over time is 
applied to the world by choice, rather than by 
necessity. 37   Nevertheless, Brouwer did assert that 
mathematical intuitions are the result of “certain 
organizational features of the human intellect.”38  For 
Brouwer, the common organizational feature is the 
intuition of unity-in-plurality over time because “the 
self of the creator’s self-awareness (which is ultimately 
the object [and source] of her knowledge) is not... ...a 
product of her legislative decision.”39  Thus, humans 
cannot choose their Self; rather they can choose to 
share the common intuition that arises out of an 
awareness of the Self.  Because humans can choose to 
follow the natural organization of their intuitions, there 
is a “stock of mathematical entities [that] is a real thing, 
for each person, and for humanity.”40 
Tieszen holds a similar view, arguing from the 
standpoint of cognitive psychology.  He believes it is 
                                                
37 Detlefsen 333. 
38 Detlefsen 333. 
39 Bowne 144. 
40 van Dalen 90. 
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perfectly sensible that human beings possess some 
“isomorphic cognitive structure” that directs 
communication.41  If Tieszen is right, it appears that 
humans are free to “act in accordance with” intuitions 
that arise out of a structure shared by all of humanity.42  
Furthermore, this entails that humans can choose to 
construct similar formalizations based upon those 
shared intuitions.  Thus, it is apparent from both 
Brouwer and Tieszen’s conception of intuition that 
Intuitionism allows for the communication of 
mathematical formalizations.  Intuitionistic 
mathematics thereby avoids the charge that it results in 
solipsism. 
 Even if the Intuitionist’s responses are deemed 
inadequate, Intuitionistic Mathematics retains an 
epistemic appeal.  At the very beginnings of 
Intuitionistic mathematics in the International Congress 
of 1904, Russell, an eminent defender of Couturat’s 
position, admitted classical logic’s inadequacy as 
demonstrated by the new “intuitionist” position. 43  
Russell’s admission was vindicated in 1931 by Gödel’s 
Incompleteness Theorem.  In contrast, the constructions 
of Intuitionistic Mathematics have been shown to be 
both sound and complete.44  Nevertheless, Brouwer had 
another motivation to argue that mathematical 
formalizations are human constructions.  Detlefsen 
argues that Brouwer’s constructivist position was “no 
doubt in part due to his mistrust of all things 
corporate.”45  Brouwer believed that communication is 
often a hidden form of coercion.  For Brouwer, 
“language, formalization, [and] communication 
are... ...all tools of the imperialists of the will in their 
                                                
41 Tieszen 185. 
42 Detlefsen 320. 
43 Bowne 9. 
44 Shapiro 26. 
45 Detlefsen 330. 
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attempts to conform the will of the autonomous 
individual to their own.”46  Classical logicians engage 
in such imperialism and deny human agents creative 
freedom by purporting a platonistic account of 
mathematics.  These logicians are convinced of their 
account because they ignore the intuitive and 
consequently constructed nature of mathematics.  Thus, 
far from trying to channel mathematics into solipsism, 
Brouwer and the Intuitionistic mathematicians are 
defenders of creative freedom. 
 
    
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
46 Detlefsen 330. 
